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Mobile devices with positioning capabilities allow users to participate in novel and exciting location-based applications.
For instance, users may track the whereabouts of their acquaintances in location-aware social networking applications, e.g.,
Foursquare. Furthermore, users can request information about landmarks in their proximity. Such scenarios require users to
report their coordinates to other parties, which may not be fully trusted. Reporting precise locations may result in serious
privacy violations, such as disclosure of lifestyle details, sexual orientation, etc. A typical approach to preserve location
privacy is to generate a cloaking region (CR) that encloses the user position. However, if locations are continuously reported,
an attacker can correlate CRs from multiple timestamps to accurately pinpoint the user position within a CR.
In this work, we protect against a broad range of attacks that breach location privacy using knowledge about: (i) maximum
user velocity; (ii) external events that may occur outside the process of self-reporting locations (e.g., social network posts
tagged by peers); and (iii) information about mutual proximity between users. Assume user u who reports two consecutive
cloaked regions A and B. We consider two distinct protection scenarios: in the first case, the attacker does not have infor-
mation about the sensitive locations on the map, and the objective is to ensure that u can reach some point in B from any
point in A. In the second case, the attacker knows the placement of sensitive locations, and the objective is to ensure that u
can reach any point in B from any point in A. We propose spatial and temporal cloaking transformations to preserve user
privacy, and we show experimentally that privacy can be achieved without significant quality of service deterioration.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: H.2.0 [General]: Security, integrity, and protection; H.2.8 [Database applications]:
Spatial databases and GIS
General Terms: Design, Experimentation, Security
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Location Privacy, Location-aware Social Networks
1. INTRODUCTION
The latest generation of social networking applications (e.g., Foursquare, Facebook Places) enable
users to share information about their geo-spatial context. Participants connect to the network using
mobile devices with positioning capabilities, and are interested in finding friends that are currently
in their geographical proximity. For instance, Alice may use such a service to ask a nearby friend to
join her for dinner, or to find on-going events close to her location. Many other similar application
scenarios exist, in which users can benefit from sharing their location data. However, serious loca-
tion privacy concerns arise, which need to be addressed for such applications to gain wide-spread
popularity.
Consider that Alice is scheduled for a medical appointment at a hospital situated in the down-
town area. Immediately after her appointment, she plans to go to a shopping mall nearby, and would
like to know if any of her acquaintances who are currently in the down-town area are interested
in joining her. Nevertheless, Alice does not want to disclose her exact coordinates (i.e., hospital),
because other service users may learn that she suffers from a medical condition. However, she has
no objection in letting her buddies know that she is in the down-town area, or within the boundaries
of a region spanning several city blocks. Therefore, a coarser-grained cloaking region (CR) may be
safe to disclose, as long as certain user-specified privacy constraints are satisfied. On the other hand,
CRs should not be excessively large, since this would affect the accuracy of location-dependent
services.
Location cloaking [Gruteser and Grunwald 2003; Gedik and Liu 2005; Gruteser and Liu 2004;
Mokbel et al. 2006; Kalnis et al. 2007; Damiani et al. 2010] is a commonly-used approach to protect
the privacy of users that access location-based services. Exact coordinates are replaced with a CR
which encloses the user and satisfies a privacy constraint. Privacy requirements are specified by
ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Fig. 1. Location privacy is breached using maximum velocity information
the user’s profile, and typically implement a privacy paradigm, such as spatial k-anonymity (SKA)
[Kalnis et al. 2007]. SKA is the most prominent location privacy paradigm proposed so far, and
aims to protect the privacy of users who ask spatial queries, such as “find the nearest restaurant
to my location”. In such scenarios, the objective is to protect the exact identity of the user who is
issuing the query, and the constraint imposed is that each CR must contain at least k distinct users.
This way, the probability of identifying the querying user is bounded above by 1/k. However, in
our application context the identity of the user is known, and the objective is to protect the exact
location of the user. Furthermore, in areas where the density of users is high (e.g., down-town) k
users can be found in close proximity to each other, and the CR can have a small extent (e.g., all k
users could be inside the hospital). Therefore, SKA is not applicable to the considered scenario.
A more appropriate protection model is the one from [Gruteser and Liu 2004; Damiani et al.
2010], where the aim is to prevent an attacker from pinpointing exact user coordinates. For instance,
in the PROBE system [Damiani et al. 2010] all locations on the map are represented as features, and
each feature has a type. Certain feature types are sensitive (e.g., hospitals, bars), whereas others are
innocuous (e.g., shopping centers, parks). Each user defines his/her own privacy profile, which spec-
ifies sensitivity thresholds with respect to each feature type. PROBE generates CRs that cover a mix
of sensitive and innocuous regions, such that the association probability between the user and sen-
sitive features is bounded below the specified threshold. However, previous work does not address
linkage attacks, which can be easily staged in practice by correlating CRs reported at consecutive
timestamps.
Velocity-based Attacks. The first type of privacy threat we address in this paper is that of
velocity-based linkage attacks that rely on knowledge about maximum velocity to pinpoint the exact
user coordinates within a reported cloaking region. Consider the example of Figure 1, where Alice
reports her (cloaked) location as she moves. We only show two consecutive time snapshots, with
corresponding CRs A (issued at time tA) and B (issued at time tB , where tB > tA). Assume that
Alice has set her current on-line status to “Visiting shops in the down-town area”. An attacker can
infer with high probability that Alice is currently walking, hence her velocity can be no higher than
5 km/h. Alternatively, if Alice’s status is “Out for a bicycle trip”, her speed can be bound to at most
20 km/h. The attacker first determines the Minkowski sum [de Berg et al. 2000] around CR A with
enlargement v · (tB − tA), where v is the inferred maximum user velocity. Next, the Minkowski
enlargement is intersected with the CR B, and the attacker infers that Alice must be situated in the
hatched sub-region of B, since she could not have physically reached any farther position. If a hos-
pital building is situated in the hatched region, then the attacker can infer that Alice has a medical
appointment, compromising her privacy.
We consider two different protection scenarios:
(i) Preventing disclosure of exact user coordinates. This protection scenario aims to prevent attack-
ers from using reported locations to stalk, or physically assault a service user.
(ii) Bounding the association probability of a user with a sensitive feature. The objective of this
protection scenario is to prevent attackers from learning private details about a user’s health
condition, religious affiliation, etc.
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We formalize both attack models, and propose solutions that generate CRs which are not vulner-
able to linkage attacks. We also take into account the resource limitations of mobile users. Specifi-
cally, we consider solutions where CRs are generated in an off-line phase, and no significant over-
head is incurred by the user to compute CRs on-line. Reporting of pre-defined regions is temporally
cloaked, in order to prevent linkage attacks. We also introduce techniques that can generate CRs
on-line, if enough resources are available to the user (or if some trusted service is employed for
this purpose). The advantage of the latter approach is that CRs are customized to the current user
location, leading to better accuracy of provided services.
External Event-based Attacks. Even if the CRs of a user are safe with respect to the self-
reported history of cloaked locations, an adversary may still breach location privacy by correlating
the self-reported history with external events, such as geo-tagged social media posts. Such posts
may be created by the users themselves, or by their peers. The posting of geo-tagged objects such
as images, videos, etc., can be used in conjunction with anonymized user whereabouts to violate
location privacy. We propose a novel algorithm that addresses this threat, and achieves an interesting
trade-off between quality of service and user satisfaction. Our algorithm blocks the publication of
geo-tagged items when they pose an immediate privacy threat, but on the other hand over-provisions
the amount of protection such that the total amount of blocked publication occurrences is minimized,
hence improving user experience.
Mutual Proximity Attacks. We also consider the case where a user wishes to keep private
her mutual proximity relationship with another user. Specifically, pairs of users coordinate their
anonymized updates, such that an adversary is not able to infer that the two came in close proximity
to each other (i.e., they had a secret meeting). This additional level of protection is achieved without
the two involved users having to share any additional location information to each other, except
for what they would have released in the absence of the additional proximity constraint, and the
immediate information they gain from meeting each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we investigate related work. We for-
malize the two alternative attack models and protection scenarios in Section 3, and we introduce the
system architecture in Section 4. In Section 5, we present our defense strategies consisting of spatial
and temporal transformations. In Section 6, we extend spatial and temporal transformations to with-
stand more complex attacks such as attacks based on external events (Section 6.1) and proximity-
based attacks (Section 6.2). We evaluate experimentally the proposed techniques in Section 7, and
we conclude with directions for future research in Section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
This section discusses research results closely related to our work. For a more general survey on
location privacy in the context of location-based services and mobile applications we refer the reader
to [Krumm 2009; Ghinita 2013; Damiani 2014].
Location cloaking was extensively studied in the context of private spatial queries. Typically,
users ask nearest-neighbor queries to servers that own databases with points of interest (e.g., restau-
rants). However, users wish to keep their exact locations private. In [Kido et al. 2005; Yiu et al.
2008], the querying user discloses one or more fake locations to the server. However, these lo-
cations could still fall within sensitive areas. Furthermore, attacks through correlation of multiple
reported locations are not addressed. A considerable number of location privacy solutions [Gruteser
and Grunwald 2003; Gedik and Liu 2005; Kalnis et al. 2007; Mokbel et al. 2006] rely on the spatial
k-anonymity (SKA) paradigm, and generate CRs that contain at least k distinct users. However, the
focus of all these approaches is on protecting user identity, not location. As a result, it is still possi-
ble that the resulting cloaking regions have small extent. Furthermore, the CRs may be completely
enclosed within sensitive areas on the map. The position paper in [Shokri et al. 2010] summarizes
SKA limitations.
More relevant to our work is the protection model in [Damiani et al. 2010; Damiani et al. 2011;
Yigitoglu et al. 2012], which aims to hide exact user coordinates, and to prevent association with
sensitive locations. In the PROBE system [Damiani et al. 2010], users define their own privacy
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profiles, by specifying maximum thresholds of association with sensitive feature types. Our privacy
model for the scenario of an attacker with background knowledge on map locations is similar to
[Damiani et al. 2010]. An alternative model to PROBE is introduced in [Xu and Cai 2009], where
a feeling-based measure of privacy protection is proposed. Specifically, the work in [Xu and Cai
2009] defines safety with respect to a single CR based on the level of popularity of enclosed regions.
Intuitively, the more popular (i.e., frequently visited) a region is, the more safe it is. A metric that is
based on entropy is used to quantify safety. The advantage of this approach is that it does not require
users to specify thresholds, which increases usability. We emphasize that, the method in [Xu and
Cai 2009] focuses on a single CR, and does not address correlation across multiple updates. Hence,
the method is orthogonal to our velocity-based attack protection approach, and in fact our proposed
techniques for enforcing consecutive CR safety can be used in conjunction with the single-CR safety
condition specified in [Xu and Cai 2009].
Another category of approaches addresses private location queries by encrypting user coordinates.
For instance, the work in [Khoshgozaran and Shahabi 2007] employs a geometrical transformation
to map locations to the one-dimensional space, and processes queries in the transformed domain.
The technique in [Ghinita et al. 2008] employs cryptographic private information retrieval (PIR)
protocols, and provides strong privacy guarantees. In an off-line phase, the database of points of
interest is organized according to the type of query supported (e.g., nearest-neighbor). At query
time, a cryptographic protocol is executed that allows the user to retrieve the requested objects.
However, this method is not suitable for the studied problem, since it assumes static data, whereas
in our case the user locations (which are the objects of interest) change frequently. Furthermore,
PIR incurs high computational and communication overhead.
The closest to our work is the method in [Cheng et al. 2006], where a random cloaking region that
encloses the user is generated. The resulting area represents an uncertainty region, which prevents
the attacker from learning the exact user location. The authors also discuss linkage attacks based
on knowledge about maximum velocity, and they propose two solutions: patching and delaying.
Patching reports the union between the current CR and the one reported in the previous timestamp.
However, the resulting area may not be contiguous, and can grow very large. Furthermore, the
method can be easily reverse-engineered, since the attacker can know that the union was performed
due to an imminent vulnerability to linkage. Delaying may incur severe service deterioration due to
dropped service requests, as we show in our experimental evaluation. In contrast to [Cheng et al.
2006], we also postdate requests, which provides zero request drop ratio, and we take into account
scenarios when the attacker has prior knowledge about the placement of sensitive regions on the
map. Another feature of our privacy mechanism is that it can be applied in different and possibly
constrained spatial contexts. For example, in [Yigitoglu et al. 2012] the technique is deployed to
protect the privacy of users moving along a road network. A simpler approach to semantic location
cloaking over road networks is presented in [Li et al. 2016]. In this case, the protection goal is
to prevent exclusively the semantic homogeneity attacks over road networks through semantic l-
diversity, while velocity-dependent threats are ignored.
The line of work in [Shokri et al. 2011; Shokri et al. 2012; Theodorakopoulos et al. 2014] as-
sumes a Bayesian adversary and proposes formal techniques for location protection. Specifically, a
probabilistic privacy metric to quantify privacy is introduced in [Shokri et al. 2011]. In [Shokri et al.
2012], protecting privacy is formulated as an optimization problem, where the goal is to maximize
the distance between the location guessed by an adversary and the actual user location, while mini-
mizing the loss in quality of service. In [Theodorakopoulos et al. 2014], the approach from [Shokri
et al. 2012] is extended to cope with correlated location updates. It is assumed that the background
knowledge of the adversary can be fully captured using a Markov model, and a Stackelberg game
strategy is employed for protection. The protection algorithm constructs a state graph, and assumes
that every movement and action of the user and adversary is modeled as a transition in this graph.
The computational cost of the solution is very high, and all computations must be done offline, in
advance, for every possible trajectory and adversary action. In the experiments in [Theodorakopou-
los et al. 2014], only a small number of locations is used, in the order of 200. Furthermore, the
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assumption that every single action can be fit to the graph representation, and most importantly,
that every action can be eventually quantified using a numerical metric, may be difficult to meet in
practice. In contrast, our approach is computationally light, the algorithms are executed online, and
we do not require strict conditions on the model of movement, adversary actions, etc.
Several privacy threats due to user co-location are discussed in [Freni et al. 2010; Ruiz-Vicente
et al. 2011; Olteanu et al. 2014]. In particular, in [Freni et al. 2010], the attacks take place when geo-
tagged resources and identities are explicitly shared by users who obfuscate their location before
disclosing it to the members of the community and to the service provider. Such attacks exploit two
kinds of information: the linkages that exist among the locations of multiple users, and the fact that
co-located users exhibit different privacy profiles, thus their cloaked regions are of different size,
leading to privacy breaches. The protection technique from [Freni et al. 2010] relies on a centralized
trusted server. Upon a concurrent service request from a set of users, the trusted server collects the
users’ privacy profiles and computes a cloaked region in compliance with the privacy preferences of
all users, possibly adding necessary corrections to prevent linkage attacks. The use of a centralized
trusted server has a number of shortcomings in terms of cost, performance, and security. In our
work, we present a more flexible approach that does not require any trusted server. In addition, we
address two novel privacy threats that have not been addressed in previous work, namely protection
in the presence of external asynchronous events, and hiding mutual proximity. The latter threat in
particular is specifically challenging for geo-social networks, as acknowledged in [Ruiz-Vicente
et al. 2011].
Finally, the recently-proposed concept of geo-indistinguishability [Chatzikokolakis et al. 2013;
Andre´s et al. 2013] provides a mechanism to randomly perturb locations, and offers quantitative
measures for the probability of an adversary to recover the real location from a reported one. Geo-
indistinguishability is inspired from the powerful model of differential privacy (DP) [Dwork 2006],
which in recent years became the de-facto standard for privacy-preserving data publishing. How-
ever, while borrowing some of the syntactic transformations of differential privacy, the work in
[Chatzikokolakis et al. 2013; Andre´s et al. 2013] does not also inherit the powerful protection se-
mantics of DP, which only permits access to data through a statistical query interface, and prevents
an adversary from learning whether a particular data item is included in a dataset or not. In effect,
DP is not applicable to operational tasks, as our problem setting requires. Geo-indistinguishability,
on the other hand, allows one direct access to perturbed data, and does offer some guarantees against
exact location disclosure, but does not address velocity-based attacks in the case of repeated updates
from the same user. In addition, if the user’s location is frequently reported, the privacy degrades
due to the correlations between locations [Chatzikokolakis et al. 2014].
3. PRIVACY AND THREAT MODELS
3.1. Preliminaries
Consider mobile user u who follows a trajectory
T = {(p1, t1), (p2, t2), . . . , (pn, tn)},
where pi = (xi, yi) is the two-dimensional point location of user u at timestamp ti. A location
snapshot at a given time t is defined as the tuple s = (p, t). Denote by S the set of location snapshots
associated with the user trajectory,S = {si}1≤i≤n. These snapshots may be equidistant in time (i.e.,
|ti − ti+1| = |ti − ti−1|), for instance as a result of periodic location updates from a GPS device.
However, this is not a requirement, and we consider that the time duration between two consecutive
snapshots is arbitrary, and is decided by the user.
Users continuously report location information corresponding to each snapshot in S. For in-
stance, in a social networking application, participants constantly update their location so they can
be tracked by their friends. In the case of location-based queries, users report location data to a
server to retrieve nearby points of interest. In the latter case, each snapshot has an associated query
parameter, specifying the query type (e.g., nearest-neighbor) as well as the requested object type
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(e.g., restaurant). To simplify the terminology, we denote by request the event of location reporting
in both cases.
Due to privacy considerations, snapshots are not disclosed in their original form. Instead, at each
timestamp ti, the user location is protected using a cloaking region CRi that replaces exact co-
ordinates. The CR is generated according to the user privacy profile (Section 3.4 properly defines
privacy requirements). Furthermore, to prevent linkage attacks, the resulting CR may be reported
at a timestamp t′i which is different than ti specified in S. We denote the reported set of cloaked
location snapshots by S ′ = {(CRi, t′i)}1≤i≤n.
The set S ′ represents the attacker view, i.e., the attacker has access to all CRs reported by a user,
as well as their reporting timestamps. However, the attacker does not know the set S. The attacker
also has knowledge about the maximum user velocity v. Our objective is to prevent the inference
of additional location information that is not included in S ′. Privacy is protected through spatial
transformations (i.e., carefully choosing the CR extents), as well as temporal transformations (i.e.,
deciding when to report CRs).
3.2. Quality of Service
Users report location information in order to facilitate meaningful interactions with their friends,
or with entities that provide services tailored to the users’ geo-spatial context. Therefore, privacy
protection should maintain a good quality of service provided to users. Ideally, the location reporting
should be performed in a timely manner (i.e., |ti − t′i| should be minimized), and the resulting CRs
should have small spatial extent (subject to fulfillment of privacy constraints). Typically, the exact
user location pi is enclosed by CRi, to provide consistency with the user’s geo-spatial context.
However, as will be discussed in Section 5.1, we allow users to report some past location if doing
so allows them to obtain good quality service without compromising privacy.
Given the two sets of original (S) and reported (S ′) snapshots, we define four metrics that char-
acterize the loss in service quality due to privacy protection:
— CR size: CRs with large areas may decrease the usability of the reported information. The CR
size metric QCR is defined as the average area of reported CRs
QCR =
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
Area(CRi)
— time error: the proposed privacy-preserving solutions may report a location snapshot at a differ-
ent timestamp than its original one. Specifically, snapshots can be delayed, i.e., t′i > ti. Time
error QT is defined as
QT =
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
|ti − t
′
i|
Note that, if the original requests have equi-distant timestamps ti, an attacker may attempt to use
the delay information to compromise privacy. In such a case, the original request sequence can
be modified such that the distance between consecutive timestamps is randomized.
— space error: when users report CRs built around past locations, it may happen that the current
user location pi falls outside the reported cloaked location CRi. Disclosing information that is
not completely up-to-date may still be useful (e.g., a user may learn the address of a nearby
restaurant, even if this is not the closest restaurant). We measure such loss of accuracy using the
space error metric, formally defined as:
QS =
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
d(pi, CRi)
where d measures the Euclidean distance between pi and its closest point in CRi.
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— failure ratio: it is possible that certain snapshots are never reported, e.g., due to the impossibility
of finding a CR that satisfies the privacy requirements. Failure ratio is defined as
FR =
Dropped Requests
T otal Requests
All other metrics are computed only for reported CRs.
In addition to the performance metrics, we also consider an additional constraint placed by the
user on the maximum delay for location reporting. For instance, if a user asks a location query, s/he
may be willing to wait only for a relatively short time to get the answer (e.g., a typical acceptable
response time may be 5sec). On the other hand, when sharing location data with friends, the users
may accept a larger delay (e.g., 60sec). We define the MaxDelay parameter that specifies the
maximum amount of time that a request can be delayed. Specifically, if (t′i − ti > MaxDelay),
then the ith request is considered as failed.
3.3. Distance Metrics for Cloaking Regions
The example of Figure 1 showed how certain geometrical properties of consecutive CRs can be
exploited by an attacker. We introduce two distance metrics between cloaking regions, the Hausdorff
distance and the point-pairwise distance, that are fundamental to the studied attack models and
proposed defenses. We measure the distance between two-dimensional points p′ and p′′ using the
Euclidean distance, denoted by d(p′, p′′).
Hausdorff Distance. Consider two cloaking regions1 A and B. The Hausdorff distance [Atallah
1998] between CRs A and B is formally defined as:
dhaus(A,B) = max{h(A,B), h(B,A)},
where
h(A,B) = max
p′∈A
min
p′′∈B
d(p′, p′′)
h(A,B) represents the direct Hausdorff distance, which measures the maximum distance between
any point in A to some point in B. h(B,A) is symmetrically defined. Figure 2 shows an example of
distance calculation. The largest distance between any point in A and some point in B is equal to the
distance from the left side of A to the left side of B, hence h(A,B) = 9. Similarly, h(B,A) = 12,
hence dhaus(A,B) = max(9, 12) = 12.
Fig. 2. Example of Hausdorff distance computation
Since rectangles are convex shapes, the Hausdorff distance between two rectangles can be effi-
ciently evaluated, by computing the Euclidean distances between the rectangles’ corners and sides.
1We consider rectangular CRs only. However, Hausdorff distance applies to other polygonal shapes as well.
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Point-Pairwise Distance. Point-pairwise distance between CRs A andB measures the maximum
distance between any point in A to any point in B. Formally,
dpp(A,B) = max
p′∈A
max
p′′∈B
d(p′, p′′)
Figure 3 gives the pseudocode to compute dhaus and dpp.
HausdorffDistance(A,B)
Input: CRs A and B with corners a1..4, b1..4 and sides lA1..4, lB1..4
Output: Hausdorff distance value
1. distAB = distBA = 0
2. for i := 1 to 4
3. d′ = min
j=1..4
d(ai, bj), d
′′ = min
j=1..4
d(bi, aj)
4. for k := 1 to 4
5. let q be the projection of ai on lBk , q′ the projection of bi on lAk
/*projection is considered with respect to a line, not a segment*/
6. if (q ∈ lBk ) then d′ = min {d′, d(ai, q)}
7. if (q′ ∈ lAk ) then d′′ = min {d′′, d(bi, q′)}
8. distAB = max{distAB , d′}, distBA = max{distBA, d′′}
9. return max{distAB, distBA}
Point-PairwiseDistance(A,B)
Input: CRs A and B identified by corners a1..4, b1..4
Output: Point-pairwise distance value
1. return max
i,j=1..4
d(ai, bj)
Fig. 3. Computing distances between cloaking regions
3.4. Attack Models and Privacy Requirements
We consider two distinct application settings, depending on whether or not the attacker has back-
ground knowledge about the sensitive locations on the map. Next, we define the attack models for
both of these settings, and we formalize the privacy requirements. We also give sufficient safety
conditions that must be met in order to ensure that reported CRs do not compromise privacy.
Fig. 4. Attack model without background knowledge
3.4.1. Attacker without Knowledge of Sensitive Locations. In this setting, the privacy objective is
to prevent the disclosure of precise locations, which may result in physical threats to the user, e.g.,
stalking or assault [Fox News ]. Consider, for instance, the well-established division of U.S. territory
into zip-code areas. The map is partitioned into disjoint regions, each of them covering an area of a
few square miles. Or, at a finer granularity level, a city can be sub-divided into block regions. As the
user moves, his/her location can be mapped to a city block identifier, and only the block identifier
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is disclosed. The privacy requirement in this case is not to allow an attacker to pinpoint the user
location within a sub-region of a reported CR.
Figure 4 shows an example of two CRs A and B which are reported by user u at timestamps
tA and tB , respectively. Without loss of generality, let tA < tB . Denote by v the maximum user
velocity, and let δt = |tB − tA|.
The attacker may try to prune parts of A and B to pinpoint u in two ways:
(i) determine if there is any location x ∈ A from which the user cannot reach some location y ∈ B,
even by traveling at maximum speed v. Formally, an attack is successful iff.
∃x ∈ A s.t. ∀y ∈ B, d(x, y) > vδt (1)
In Figure 4, a user traveling from point x′ is able to reach a point in the hatched region of B
within time δt. However, if the initial location of u were x′′, reaching B would not have been
possible. Therefore, an attacker can rule out a subset of A as possible positions for u, hence
privacy is breached
(ii) determine if there is any location y ∈ B which the user cannot reach from some initial location
x ∈ A, even by traveling at maximum speed v. Formally,
∃y ∈ B s.t. ∀x ∈ A, d(x, y) > vδt (2)
To prevent privacy breaches, we need to ensure that none of Eq. (1) or (2) ever holds. Note that,
according to the definition of Section 3.3, this is equivalent to stating that the Hausdorff distance
dhaus(A,B) ≤ vδt.
Fig. 5. Attack model with background knowledge
3.4.2. Attacker with Knowledge of Sensitive Locations. In practice, the attacker may have access
to a map containing the placement of sensitive locations. We adopt the privacy profile proposed in
[Damiani et al. 2010], where each object on the map is abstracted as a feature. Each feature has a
type, (e.g., restaurant, park, etc). Some types are innocuous (e.g., shopping malls), whereas others
are sensitive in nature (e.g., hospitals).
Denote by FT = {ft1, . . . , f tm} the set of feature types. Users specify their profiles as an array
P = {thr1, . . . , thrm} of thresholds, where thrj represents the maximum allowed probability of
association between a user and a sensitive feature of type ftj . The privacy requirement in this case
dictates that the association probability between a user and a sensitive feature type must not exceed
the user-specified threshold. Given CR A, the probability of association is equal to the area of the
sub-region in A covered by sensitive features of type ftj divided by the entire area of A. Formally,
a CR satisfies privacy if
∀ i = 1..m,
∑
∀f∈fti
Area(f ∩ CR)
Area(CR)
≤ thri
Consider the example in Figure 5. There are two feature types (shown shaded), Hospital and
Nightclub, and the user has specified a threshold of 0.5 for both types. Each of the two CRs taken
individually does satisfy the privacy requirement. However, if the attacker uses information about
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maximum user velocity, the disclosure of both A and B violates privacy. For instance, the presence
of user u in an innocuous location x ∈ A precludes u from being located at innocuous location
y′ ∈ B. Instead, u must be inside some sensitive area within B (e.g., at point y). The privacy breach
can be formalized as
∃x ∈ A|(x is non− sensitive) s.t.
∄y ∈ B|(y is non− sensitive ∧ d(x, y) < vδt)
Symmetrically, a breach occurs if
∃y ∈ B|(y is non− sensitive) s.t.
∄x ∈ A|(x is non− sensitive ∧ d(x, y) < vδt)
To prevent privacy breaches, we must ensure that the user can be located outside sensitive areas
at both timestamps. Since in the worst case the safe regions in two distinct CRs can be situated in
their two opposite corners, a sufficient condition to ensure disclosure safety is dpp(A,B) ≤ vδt.
3.4.3. Location Disclosure Safety Condition
Definition 3.1. Two cloaked regions A and B separated by time interval δt are safe to disclose
in the attack model without background knowledge if dhaus(A,B) ≤ vδt. Similarly, in the attack
model with background knowledge the two regions are safe to disclose if dpp(A,B) ≤ vδt.
3.4.4. Transitivity of the Safety Property. So far, we considered the safety property with respect
to a pair of CRs. However, in our attack models, the entire set of reported CRs is available to an
attacker. We show that the location disclosure safety property is transitive for both attack scenarios.
This is an important result, since it means that at any time it is sufficient to check whether con-
secutive CRs are safe to disclose. Then, by induction, any pair of reported CRs are safe. However,
in the CR generation algorithms, we only need to consider the most recent CR, which decreases
considerably the computational overhead of the proposed solutions.
LEMMA 3.2. Let A, B and C be three CRs disclosed at timestamps tA, tB, tC , such that tA <
tB < tC . Then, if the pairs of CRs (A,B) and (B,C) are safe to disclose, so is the pair (A,C).
Proof: We prove the transitivity property for both CR distance metrics.
Case 1 (dhaus):
The proof is by contradiction. Assume that the pair (A,C) is not safe to disclose. Therefore,
dhaus(A,C) > v(tC − tA). On the other hand, by hypothesis, the pairs (A,B) and (B,C) are safe
to disclose, therefore
dhaus(A,B) ≤ v(tB − tA)
and
dhaus(B,C) ≤ v(tC − tB)
Adding the two inequalities term by term, we obtain that
dhaus(A,B) + dhaus(B,C) ≤ v(tC − tA)
However, the Hausdorff distance satisfies the triangle inequality [Henrikson 1999]
dhaus(A,B) + dhaus(B,C) ≥ dhaus(A,C)
therefore
dhaus(A,C) ≤ v(tC − tA)
We obtain a contradiction, therefore the pair (A,C) must be safe to disclose.
Case 2 (dpp):
Let x ∈ A, y ∈ B be two point locations s.t. dpp(A,B) = d(x, y). It is guaranteed that such two
points exist from the definition of dpp. Similarly, let y′ ∈ B, z ∈ C s.t. dpp(B,C) = d(y′, z) and
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let x′ ∈ A, z′ ∈ C s.t. dpp(A,C) = d(x′, z′). Take any random point p ∈ B. From the triangle
inequality, we have that
d(x′, z′) ≤ d(x′, p) + d(p, z′)
On the other hand,
d(x′, p) ≤ d(x, y) ∧ d(p, z′) ≤ d(y′, z)
It follows immediately that
dpp(A,C) ≤ dpp(A,B) + dpp(B,C)
and since, by hypothesis,
dpp(A,B) ≤ v(tB − tA) ∧ dpp(B,C) ≤ v(tC − tB)
it results that
dpp(A,C) ≤ v(tC − tA)
Therefore, disclosure safety is transitive with respect to dpp as well. ✷
3.5. Privacy Discussion
Our work focuses on attacks that an adversary may stage using information on mobile user velocity.
In our view, such attacks are a very real threat in practice, and it is important to have protection
techniques that can mitigate such threats. There are, however, other types of attacks which, although
important, are outside the focus of our work. Solutions to such attacks are often orthogonal to our
proposed techniques, and can be integrated with our approach without major modifications.
In our approach, we consider that the feature types are static, i.e., they do not evolve over time. In
some practical scenarios, the characteristics of a certain feature type can change with time, possibly
on a cyclical basis. For instance, a store that would have been safe to include in a CR at 3pm becomes
unsafe at 9pm, as the adversary may know that the store is closed, and will be able to infer that the
user must actually be elsewhere within the CR. Our methods can be easily extended to address this
case, by dynamically updating the feature map. For instance, a system component orthogonal to
our techniques may take as input opening times for each map feature, and mark stores as a non-
accessible zone outside opening hours. As a result, when computing CR safety, such zones will not
count, and a larger CR will be constructed that will include sufficient non-sensitive zones that are
also accessible. The feature map is an input to our approach, so no changes to our techniques are
necessary.
Another scenario of practical importance is the case when movement is restricted to a road net-
work, as opposed to the free-space movement case which is currently the focus of our work. Note
that, the principles of construction for our protection mechanisms remain valid for restricted move-
ment, with the difference that rectangular CRs will become connected sets of graph vertices. The
current solution for free space movement remains applicable to many scenarios, especially to city
areas, where the road network is dense, and activities such as walking and cycling can be reasonably
approximated as free space movement.
4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Figure 6 shows the proposed system architecture. Users feed their exact location information and
privacy profile (Section 3.4) to a cloaking engine, which keeps track of previously-reported CRs and
ensures that the disclosure safety condition is met (with respect to the attack scenario considered,
i.e., with vs without background knowledge). The proposed architecture is flexible with respect to
the deployment of the cloaking engine. Our privacy-preserving transformations are suitable both
for a two-tier model, where the user’s mobile device performs the cloaking, or a three-tier model,
where the cloaking is delegated to a trusted third-party service. Note that, as opposed to spatial
k-anonymity techniques [Kalnis et al. 2007] that require a trusted anonymizer service to pool large
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Fig. 6. System Architecture
number of users, our system architecture does not have such a conceptual constraint. However,
we consider employing such a service as an alternative that improves performance, if the mobile
device does not possess sufficient computational resources. Furthermore, in the case of attacks with
background knowledge, the feature maps required to cloak locations may be too large to be stored
(and updated) on a mobile device.
5. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ALGORITHMS
In this section, we present the proposed techniques to preserve the privacy of user requests. We
consider two transformations2:
(1) Temporal Cloaking. In some applications, the dataspace (e.g., a city map) is partitioned into a
fixed set of regions. We assume that all regions have rectangular shape, i.e., the map is partitioned
into a set of tiles. This case fits scenarios where it is expensive to compute CRs on-line, or
when the splitting is pre-defined (e.g., CRs represent zip-code areas). Consider the example in
Figure 7(a), where the tiling is shown with dotted lines. The current time is t1, and the user lies in
CR B. Previously, at time t0, CR A was disclosed. Assuming that the adversary has background
knowledge about the map, CR B can only be disclosed if the distance dpp(A,B) ≤ vδt, where
δt = t1 − t0. In the example, the condition does not hold, hence B cannot be issued at time t1.
Instead, the request is delayed. Temporal cloaking is presented in detail in Section 5.1.
(2) Spatial Cloaking. In situations where enough resources exist to compute the CRs on-line, and no
requirements for a fixed partitioning exist, the CRs can be constructed in such a manner that the
safety property is met. Figure 7(b) shows a potential zone where the CR can be situated, within
the vδt boundary. A CR construction algorithm can take into consideration the boundary, and
find a CR that is safe to disclose. We introduce spatial transformations in Section 5.2.
5.1. Temporal Cloaking
Temporal cloaking is suitable when the partition of the map into CRs is fixed in advance. Note
that, since no CR computation is performed on-line, temporal cloaking is particularly suitable to
be performed directly on the mobile device. As an additional benefit, performing cloaking on the
device itself can make use of supplementary information about the user’s trajectory. For instance,
if a user is following the instructions of an in-car GPS navigation system, the future trajectory is
already known to a considerable extent.
We identify two alternatives for achieving temporal cloaking: request deferral and postdating.
We illustrate these two concepts in Figure 8. Consider user u who wants to issue a request at current
time tq . The location of u is enclosed by CR C. Previously at time tA, u issued a request with CR
2We use the terms temporal and spatial cloaking to distinguish between the transformations that mainly target the time,
respectively the space dimension. We emphasize that even for temporal transformations, the user location is still cloaked
with the help of CRs.
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Fig. 7. Approach Overview
Fig. 8. Temporal Cloaking: Deferral vs Postdating
A. Prior to entering C, u was situated inside region B, but no request with associated CR B was
issued. At current time tq, C is not safe to disclose3, as it is too far away from A.
The first option is to defer the request until C becomes safe to disclose, i.e., until tC s.t.
d(A,C) ≤ v(tC − tA), tC ≥ tA + d(A,C)/v,
where d can signify either the dhaus or dpp distance. In this case, the request is delayed for a period
of time equal to tC − tq. Note that, by that time it is possible that u will no longer be situated
inside C, therefore a space error may be incurred. The second alternative is to issue the request
immediately at tq , but using CR B. Note that, since u is already outsideB, the request will certainly
incur some amount of space error. However, if the current position of u is not far away from B
(e.g., u has only recently exited B), the error is likely to be low. We refer to this method as request
postdating. Note that, it is not always the case that the tile/region visited by u just before its current
tile is safe to disclose. Nevertheless, the same idea can be applied with respect to the last safe-to-
disclose visited region. Keeping track of such a region is not computationally expensive, and can
be done upon the receival of a GPS location update. Furthermore, the storage requirement is O(1),
since only one such region is maintained.
With the deferral and postdating primitives defined, we next devise a strategy that combines the
two methods in order to maintain good QoS. We propose an heuristic that chooses the best of the
two based on benefit estimation. Using the same convention as earlier, let A be the CR of the last
issued request (which occurred at time tA), let C be the CR currently enclosing the user, and let
B be the last safe region visited before C. Note that, the existence of B is always guaranteed, as
in the worst case we have A = B. We also assume that the user has the ability to predict (with
3In this example, we consider an attacker with background knowledge, and we measure safety with respect to dpp . However,
this scenario applies to dhaus as well.
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Fig. 9. Space error as a result of temporal cloaking
reasonable accuracy) its position at a future time. This prediction will be used in evaluating whether
deferral or postdating is more beneficial. Since the proposed solution is an heuristic in the first
place, predicting future locations with high accuracy is not a necessity. A low prediction accuracy
will, however, affect the obtained QoS.
Let tC be the time when C becomes safe to disclose, and denote by ℓ(tC) the estimated position
of u at time tC . If the request is deferred, two distinct situations arise, as shown in Figure 9:
(1) ℓ(tC) /∈ C. In this case, by the time C becomes safe, the user would have already exited C.
Denote by dC the minimum distance from ℓ(tC) to any point in C, and let p be the point that
minimizes that distance. Then, dC represents an upper bound on the inaccuracy of the location
reporting. For instance, if the request represents a nearest-neighbor query, and the NN of p is
situated at distance r from p, then according to the triangle inequality, the NN of p will be at
distance at most r+ dC from ℓ(tC). Therefore, the space error dC is a good measure of the QoS
deterioration due to privacy enforcement.
(2) ℓ(tC) ∈ C. In this case, the user is still inside C at time tC , therefore no space error is incurred.
The time error is tC − tq in both cases mentioned above. If the request is postdated (i.e., CR B is
issued at time tq), the time error is 0, and the space error is dB .
Figure 10 details the proposed heuristic. The TemporalCloaking routine gets invoked at every
timestamp tq when a request is scheduled. The heuristic will determine (line 6) whether deferring
the request exceeds the user-specified delay threshold MaxDelay (defined in Section 3.2). If the
threshold is exceeded, then the request is postdated (line 7). Otherwise, the distances dB and dC are
compared (line 8), to determine whether it is more beneficial in terms of space error to issue B or C.
The closest of the two CRs to the location of u is selected, and the request is postdated or deferred
depending on the comparison outcome.
5.2. Spatial Cloaking
When the user’s mobile device has sufficient resources, or when cloaking is performed by a trusted
service, CRs can be dynamically computed at the time of the request. The advantage of such an
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TemporalCloaking
Input: request timestamp tq , location of requester u
Output: (R, tR) where R is the request CR and tR is the issuance time
1. A = last issued CR at time tA
2. B = last visited CR safe to disclose
3. C = CR enclosing u at tq
4. tC = tA + dist(A,C)v /*dist is either dhaus or dpp */
5. dB = min. distance from u to B, dC = min. distance from ℓ(tC) to C
6. if(tC − tq > MaxDelay)
7. return (B, tq) /* postdate B */
8. else if(dB < dC)
9. return (B, tq) /* postdate B */
10. else
11. return (C, tC ) /* defer C */
Fig. 10. Heuristic for Temporal Cloaking
Fig. 11. Reverse-engineering attack when CR construction takes as seed the user location
on-line approach is that the CR can be tailored for the user’s privacy profile, and consequently
the QoS can be improved. In this section, we focus on the more difficult setting of an attacker
with background knowledge, i.e., the CRs must be constructed taking into consideration the sets of
sensitive features and associated sensitivity thresholds introduced in Section 3.4. Attacks without
background knowledge can be addressed as a special case where all sensitivity thresholds are set to
∞.
Assume that at some point along its trajectory, user u is situated inside a hospital H . Denote by
thrH = 0.5 the sensitivity threshold of u for feature type hospital. In this case, it is necessary to
reduce the probability of association of u with H by creating a CR at least twice as large as the
area of H . On the other hand, if the user is in a non-sensitive area, then the exact location could
potentially be disclosed, since this is not a privacy violation4.
Note that, computing and reporting a CR only when the user is inside the hospital is not an accept-
able solution, since an adversary that has knowledge about the algorithm used for cloaking could
immediately infer from the fact that a CR is generated that u must be inside the hospital. Therefore,
the cloaking algorithm must take into account the sensitive features in the user’s proximity even if
the user is not currently situated within the perimeter of sensitive locations.
One naive solution could work as follows: given a distance r (chosen as a system parameter),
initiate the CR construction whenever some sensitive feature is situated at distance less than r from
u. This requirement is equivalent to an inclusion condition stating that every sensitive feature within
distance r from u must be enclosed in the CR. This way, the fact that a CR including a hospital is
generated does not imply that the user is necessarily inside a hospital. However, such an approach is
vulnerable to reverse-engineering by an adversary, as shown next: Consider the example in Figure 11
with two sensitive features H1 and H2. An attacker that learns the disclosed CR including both
4Alternatively, if users do not wish to disclose exact locations, a random region with size above some minimum threshold
can be trivially generated.
15
Fig. 12. Spatial Cloaking
features may infer that the user is at distance at most r from both H1 and H2. By intersecting the
Minkowski sum enlargements of the two features by radius r the adversary can narrow down the
dataspace region where u is situated. In general, any CR construction algorithm that takes as seed
the current user location may be susceptible to reverse-engineering attacks.
Spatial Cloaking
Input: request timestamp tq , last disclosed CR A
Output: next CR B, issuance time tB
1. MS(A) = MinkowskiSum of A with enlargement v(tq − tA)
2. SF = {f ∈ F|f ∩MS(A) 6= ∅}
3. while ¬empty(SF ) do
4. f = random element in SF , SF = SF{f}
5. if (u ∈ f ) then Sensitive=True
6. R = Enlarge(f) //repeatedly considers all four directions
7. if R 6= null and u ∈ R then
8. tB = max{tq , tA + dpp(A,B)v }
9. return (R, tB)
10. if Sensitive=True then Drop Request
11. else return (u, tq)
Fig. 13. Spatial Cloaking Pseudocode
To prevent reverse-engineering attacks, we propose a method that constructs CRs which are not
directly dependent on the user location, but instead are built starting from the last reported CR,
which is already known to the adversary (i.e., the adversary does not learn additional information
even if s/he is capable of recovering the input used for spatial cloaking). This strategy is illustrated
in Figure 12, which shows the user location and the last disclosed CR A. The numbered rectangles
represent sensitive features. Denote by MS(A) the Minkowski sum of A enlarged by v(tq − tA):
MS(A) encloses all locations where user u could be situated at request time tq. The CR construction
consist of three steps:
Step1. Filtering of features. All sensitive features that intersect MS(A) represent the set SF of
candidates for inclusion in the CR. For instance, in Figure 12(a), the set of selected features is
SF = {f1, f2, f3}. Note that, if the set SF is empty, then no privacy threat exists with respect
to the current location of u, and therefore the location of u can be directly disclosed.
Step 2. Cloaking. The cloaking step chooses a sensitive feature f ∈ SF and progressively en-
larges it to find a CR (denoted by CRf ) that satisfies the privacy requirement (i.e., the sensitive
area within the CR represents a fraction of the total CR area no larger than the user-specified
threshold). Initially, CRf is set to be equal to f . As long as CRf does not satisfy the privacy
constraint, it is enlarged by a fixed amount e (Figure 12(b)) along one of its sides (in the order
{top, right, bottom, left}). The process stops if CRf satisfies the privacy constraint. If the re-
sulting region encloses the location of u, Step 3 is executed for the obtained CR. Alternatively, if
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all features in SF are considered but no CR that satisfies both properties is found, there are two
cases: (1) if the location of u is not enclosed by a sensitive feature, then the exact point location
of u can be disclosed. Otherwise, (2) the user is inside a sensitive feature, and in this case, since
no CR can be found, the request is dropped. The latter case may occur, for instance, in a scenario
where the sum of areas of all sensitive features may represent a larger fraction of the dataspace
than specified by the privacy threshold. However, as we show in the experimental evaluation, the
request drop rate is low in practice, even for demanding privacy requirements.
Note that, if the order in which the sensitive features are processed is known, the attacker may
be able to pinpoint the user location. Consider features f1 and f2 in Figure 12(c), with resulting
cloaked regions CR1 and CR2, respectively. Assume that f1 is processed before f2. If CR2
is issued, the attacker can infer that the user is not located inside CR1 (otherwise CR1 would
have been issued), and can therefore learn that the user cannot be situated in the hatched region,
possibly leading to a violation of the privacy threshold within CR2. To prevent such inference,
the features in SF are processed in random order.
Step 3. Safety enforcement.
In Figure 12(c), the obtained CR2 is enclosed by MS(A). However, this does not guarantee that
dpp(A,CR2) ≤ v(tq − tA), therefore an additional delay may be necessary, similar to temporal
cloaking. This situation is even more clearly illustrated in Figure 12(d), where the obtained CR′2
extends beyond the boundaries of MS(A). Given that the attacker already knows A, CR′2 is not
safe to disclose. To ensure safety, similar to the case of temporal cloaking, the CR is deferred for
a time equal to dpp(A,CR′2)/v − (tq − tA). Note that, since no intermediate CR is computed
between A and CR′2, post-dating is not possible in this case.
Figure 13 summarizes the spatial cloaking process. First, the algorithm determines the set SF of
sensitive features enclosed by MS(A) (line 1). Next, the features in SF are considered in random
order, and enlarged until a CR is obtained such that it satisfies the privacy constraints and it encloses
the user (line 7). If the obtained CR is not safe, it is deferred until tB , computed in line 8. If no valid
CR is found and u is inside a sensitive feature (line 10), the request is dropped.
6. PROTECTION MODELS AND ALGORITHMS FOR MOBILE INTERACTING USERS
So far, we focused on the case of protecting the location of an individual mobile user across multiple
snapshots of position reporting. However, in today’s computing landscape, mobile users constantly
interact with each other through social media applications, and often in ways that directly involve
geospatial information. For instance, location-based social networks (LBSNs) allow users to post
geo-tagged content related to an event (e.g., photos, videos), in which multiple users are present.
Tagging of users and their locations represents a potential privacy threat. In some cases, one can
immediately detect and protect against direct breaches of privacy, e.g., when a photo is taken in
a hospital, night club, etc., by simply blocking the tagging process. Most LBSNs require explicit
permission from all entities that are geo-tagged before allowing the event to be posted. However, in
practice, there are many cases where the privacy breach occurs in a more subtle fashion, for which
requesting for direct user consent is not sufficient, due to geospatial inferences that an adversary
may perform. Specifically, even though a particular geo-tagged post does not in itself pose a privacy
threat (e.g., a group photo taken in a public park at noon), an adversary may use that information
in conjunction with past and future location snapshot updates from users to infer private details
regarding a user’s whereabouts in the hours before and after the photo was taken. We provide a
detailed description of this threat model and solutions to prevent it in Section 6.1.
In addition, there are other scenarios of interest outside the realm of location-based social media
that require location protection with respect to the trajectories of multiple users. For instance, certain
users may wish to keep secret the fact that they came in close spatial proximity to other individuals.
As a motivating example, consider two business executives that have a secret meeting to plan a
possible merger of their companies. Should an adversary find that such a meeting took place, this
could have a negative impact on the outcome of the merger, and could cause the stocks of the
17
Fig. 14. Privacy Breach in the Presence of External Events
two companies to plummet. In another scenario, a journalist may wish to have a secret encounter
with one of her sources to collect information about a sensitive political issue that may endanger
the reputation, or even the life of the source, should an adversary learn about their encounter. We
address this case in Section 6.2.
6.1. Protection in the Presence of External Disclosure Events
In this section, we investigate the privacy threat that arises when an external location disclosure
event occurs outside the process of trajectory anonymization executed by each mobile user. Such
situations often arise in practice, for instance in a social network application when a user is present in
a photo with geospatial tags. We first overview the attack mechanism, and then propose a solution to
protect against this threat. Also, we investigate the trade-off that occurs between protection strength
and user satisfaction.
Consider the example in Figure 14 where user u updates her location with her service provider
(e.g., LBSN) as she moves. To protect her location, the user’s mobile device employs one of the
mechanisms presented in Section 5. In the diagram, A, B and C (shown as rectangles with contin-
uous lines) represent the reported CRs at timestamps tA, tB and tC , respectively. CRs A, B and C
are safe with respect to maximum velocity v.
Later on, after the user has released all CRs, and hence cannot adjust them further without re-
vealing more details about her location, one of her social network friends wishes to post a photo
that user u and her friends took inside restaurant R (shown with dotted line) at time t′B < tB . Note
that, there is nothing sensitive about the fact that u was inside R, but due to velocity constraints, and
having access to already released CRs A and B, an adversary can infer that u must have been in a
smaller area than the reported CR A at time tA. That smaller area may be associated with a hospital
H , and hence the privacy of u is breached. A similar disclosure can occur for CR C, as the new
maximum travel distance v × (tC − t′B) may pinpoint u’s location inside another sensitive hospital
area.
To address this privacy threat, one straightforward solution would be for user u to reject being
tagged in the LBSN event, and thus disallow her identity to be included in the photo. However,
this decreases user satisfaction, as u may want to be present as part of the event description of the
encounter with her friends. Rejecting too many geo-tagged updates may determine her friends to
remove u from their friend lists. Furthermore, even if u rejects the tag, her friends may still go
ahead and post the photo without u’s name tag. Doing so may still allow an adversary to either
visually identify her from the photo, or run some automated face recognition program to assert that
u is actually in the photo (even though she is not present in the event metadata). Hence, location
disclosure may occur even if u blocks the update.
We propose an approach whereby users take into account the fact that future external events
may create privacy breaches, and execute a modified version of the cloaking algorithms, in which
each published CR is overprovisioned to protect against possible future additional disclosure. This
18
way, even if a future geo-tagged event occurs, it is possible that the additional disclosure does not
constitute a privacy breach. Of course, overprovisioning will cause the quality of service received
by the user to decrease, by incurring higher space error and request failure ratios. Hence, a trade-off
emerges between the benefit of overprovisioning in allowing integration of future external updates
on the one hand, and its negative impact on quality of service on the other hand.
One effective approach to control the amount of overprovisioning is by adjusting the maximum
velocity parameter v used when checking for CR safety. Decreasing the value of v to a smaller value
vO =
v
α
(denoting velocity with overprovisioning) has the effect of building more conservative
CRs, which are closer to the previously published CRs than the case when a higher maximum
velocity is used. Note that, the user velocity itself is not bounded. Users are still free to move with
the speed that they would otherwise, it is just the speed bound for building CRs that changes. As
an effect, the chances of a future external event disclosure being within the bounds of a safe CR
with respect to the lower v increase. Another advantage is that decreasing the velocity bound has an
isomorphic effect on CR placement in all directions, and thus increases the probability of allowing a
future geo-tagged update for which the actual position is not known in advance. Finally, the amount
of overprovisioning can be captured with a single parameter, namely α, which facilitates system
tuning.
Each mobile user will choose CRs following an overprovisioning strategy with parameter α,
where α is dynamically tuned to achieve a favorable trade-off between the percentage of blocked
geo-tag events (which should be as low as possible) and the space error and request failure ratio,
which should be minimized to preserve quality of service. In cases where no privacy breach results
due to external events, the parameter α should decrease towards 1 (its minimum value), leading to
the case where no overprovisioning is performed. Conversely, if a high rate of blocked events is
recorded, α should be rapidly increased.
To obtain a good trade-off between blocking rate on the one hand, and space error and request
failure ratio on the other, we employ a linear decrease - exponential increase approach to dynami-
cally tune the value of parameter α. Specifically, each user starts its anonymization algorithm with
an initial α0 setting, which is a system-wide parameter. If there are no blocked events, then the value
of α decreases linearly with time as
α = max{α0 − a× t, 1}
On the other hand, if the rate of blocked updates reaches a threshold β, then the algorithm doubles
the value of α at each time granule as long as the blocked rate in that time period exceeds β. This
way, the system adjusts quickly to counter high event-blocking rates. The pseudocode in Figure 15
summarizes the proposed approach.
Overprovisioned Cloaking (executed at each time granule δt)
Input: initial overprovisioning parameter α0, minimum threshold αmin , maximum blocking rate β
Output: next cloaking region CR, updated α
1. vO = vα
2. while (true) do
3. blocking rate br = approved tag requests
received tag requests
4. if (br < β) then
5. α = max{α− a× δt, 1}
6. else
7. α = 2× α
8. vO = vα
9. compute new CR with respect to α and previous CR
10. t = t+ δt
Fig. 15. Pseudocode for Adaptive External Event-Aware Location Cloaking
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If an event is blocked, no further action is necessary. However, if an event is accepted, then it
becomes yet another update in the movement history of the user, and it needs to be treated accord-
ingly. The pseudocode in Figure 16 describes the algorithm for inserting an external event update
in the user’s past position history. As each event is basically a geo-tagged object, we refer to an
event as a social tag. The algorithm takes as input a sequence S of timestamped CRs that have
already been disclosed for a user, and an incoming social tag, having timestamp ttag and spatial
extent Rtag. Since the tag will be part of the history of the user after acceptance, we have to check
if any past position became unsafe due to tag acceptance. In lines 1–2 the candidate position for
insertion is found. In the case when ttag is equal to some past CR timestamp, it is excluded by input
pre-conditions, since in that case it is accepted only if it is a duplicate of a previously known CR
(same timestamp and same region). Once the candidate position is found, the tag T is inserted in
sequence seq (line 7) only if it is safe with respect to both previous (line 3) and following (line 5)
disclosed positions.
Insert a social geo-tag
Input: sequence of disclosed CRs: seq = {(t1, CR1), . . . , (tn, CRn)}, i < j ⇒ ti < tj
social geo-tag: T = (ttag, CRtag), ∀i ttag <> ti
Output: original sequence (tag rejected)
extended sequence (tag accepted)
// find the candidate position for T in seq
1. prev = last (ti, CRi) such that ttag > ti
2. next = first (ti, CRi) such that ttag < ti
3. if prev <> ⊥ and not isSafe(prev, (ttag, CRtag)) then
4. return seq // reject: T it unsafe w.r.t. previous position
5. if next <> ⊥ and not isSafe((ttag, CRtag), next) then
6. return seq // reject: T it unsafe w.r.t. following position
7. insert (ttag, CRtag) in seq before next
8. return seq // accept: T it safe
Fig. 16. Insert Tag Pseudocode
6.2. Protection of Relative User Proximity
In this section, we focus on scenarios where it is important to protect against inferring that two (or
more) mobile users were co-located at a certain moment in time. We restrict our discussion at the
two users case, as the general case with more than two users can be easily generalized.
The two users wish to provide to their service providers anonymized trajectories that hide their
mutual proximity relationship. In addition to the methods proposed in Section 5, where each user
generates CRs in such a way that association with any sensitive areas due to velocity bounds is pre-
vented, Alice and Bob also need to ensure that there is always a certain threshold distance between
their possible location. We called this threshold separation distance and we denote it by S.
Figure 17 illustrates an example of this scenario, and an overview of the process of enforcing
separation. Users Alice (U1) and Bob (U2) move towards each other. At time tA, both posted their
location updates, namely A1 and A2, respectively. The two CRs were further apart from each other
than separation distance S. At the next time stamp tB , according to the independent anonymization
algorithm executed by the users, their tentative CRs would be B1 and B2, shown with dotted line.
While these two CRs abide the safety requirements stemming from the velocity constraint, they do
not satisfy the separation threshold. In fact, they overlap, which may lead an adversary to infer with
high probability that Alice and Bob might have met.
The objective of the relative user proximity protection algorithm is to generate individual CRs
that are both within the safety bounds dictated by maximum velocity, but at the same time they
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Fig. 17. Overview of Enforcing Threshold Distance Separation
are further apart from each other than separation threshold S. In the example of Figure 17, CRs
B1 and B2 are suppressed, and instead the CRs B′1 and B′2 are released. Note that, it is possible
(and in fact likely) that the two users are no longer enclosed within their reported CRs. As in the
case of the techniques presented in Section 5, this situation creates a decrease in quality of service,
as any location-based query asked with respect to B′1 or B′2 will return sub-optimal results for the
respective users.
The objective of the protection mechanism is to enforce the separation threshold while at the
same time minimizing the decrease in quality of service. A good measure of the latter is the distance
between the actual user location and the closest point in its reported CR. If the CR encloses the user,
then there is no penalty. As there are two users, the metric to minimize is the sum of the distances.
In addition, it may be important to maintain more information in the direction of movement of
the users. In other words, users are less likely to be interested in locations that are behind them,
than forward ones. Following that intuition, we construct the perpendicular bisector of the segment
connecting the two users, and symmetrically place the two CRs at equal distance from the bisector.
However, none of the users wishes to disclose his or her exact location, so only safe information
should be used in the process.
Figure 18 illustrates the proposed solution, and the pseudocode in Figure 19 details the algorithm
steps. The algorithm receives as input a separation threshold S and a pair of CRs B1 and B2,
corresponding to the tentative CRs of users u1 and u2, respectively. In case the minimal distance of
B1 and B2 satisfies threshold S, there is no need to change them (line 3). Otherwise we determine
the direction of displacement −→v along the line passing through the center of mass of the two CRs
for the initial user coordinates (line 5), or orthogonal to the bisector of the direction of movement of
the two users for subsequent timestamps (line 10). In order to satisfy the separation constraint we
translate the two CRs by a total of S plus the maximum diameter of the two CRs (line 12). Since
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Fig. 18. Technical Details of Threshold Separation of CRs
the two users cooperate, each CR is translated according to one half of the displacement vector in
the two opposite directions (lines 13-14).
We assume that the users who want to hide their proximity are able to communicate directly,
and that position reporting is synchronous for all users. These restrictions are used to simplify the
presentation, but can be removed in practice with minimal changes, thus not hindering the generality
of the approach. Specifically, if updates are not synchronized, one simple solution is for the system
to apply the deferral technique presented in Section 5.1 for the user with the earlier update. Then,
when the update from the other user is received, the algorithm for synchronous updates is performed.
The tradeoff of this method is accuracy, as the first user will experience a slightly higher space error.
7. EXPERIMENTS
We implemented a Java prototype of the proposed temporal and spatial transformation methods. The
experimental testbed consists of a P4 2.0GHz machine with 1GB of RAM running Linux OS 2.6. We
ran tests both on synthetic and on real datasets. The synthetic datasets allow us to vary continuously
parameters such as maximum velocity, thus providing a clear illustration of the behavior trends of
the proposed solutions for a broad range of parameters. On the other hand, evaluation on real data
proves the practical applicability of our approach.
In the case of synthetic data, we consider a dataspace of 10, 000× 10, 000 meters, corresponding
to a medium-size city. In each experimental run, we randomly generate 100 trajectories consisting
of 30 distinct timestamps each with an average delay of 30sec between consecutive requests. We
consider maximum user velocities MaxSpeed between 1m/s (walking speed) and 30m/s (high-
way driving speed). The actual user velocity is uniformly distributed in the range MaxSpeed/2 to
MaxSpeed. All results are averaged over ten random seeds.
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Proximity Protection
Input: CRs B1 and B2 of position reports from users u1 and u2, separation threshold S.
Output: B′1 and B′2 such that dist(B′1, B′2) ≥ S
1. d = dist(B1, B2)
2. if (d ≥ S)
3. return B1 and B2
4. A1, A2 = most recently disclosed positions for u1 and u2
5. if (A1, A2 are first disclosed positions)
6. −→v = unitary vector from the center of B1 toward the center of B2
7. else
8. −→v1 = unitary vector from the center of A1 toward the center of B1
9. −→v2 = unitary vector from the center of A2 toward the center of B2
10. −→v ⊥ = unitary angle bisector vector of −→v1 and −→v2
11. −→v = rotate −→v ⊥ 90◦ toward the center of B2
12.
−−−−−−−−−→
displacement = −→v (S +max(diam(B1), diam(B2)))
13. B′1 = translate B1 according to − 12
−−−−−−−−−→
displacement
14. B′2 = translate B2 according to 12
−−−−−−−−−→
displacement
15. return B′1 and B′2
Fig. 19. CR displacement for proximity protection
The real workload considered consists of the Rome taxi dataset from the CRAWDAD repos-
itory5. The data were collected from real GPS traces of Rome taxi drivers during the month of
February 2014. Within the dataset, we group trajectories according to maximum recorded speed, so
that we can obtain two different maximum speed settings, namely Slow with speeds ranging within
[0, 5]m/s, and Fast with speeds in the interval [10, 18]m/s.
We present the results for temporal and spatial cloaking in Sections 7.1 and Section 7.2, respec-
tively. Section 7.3 shows the results for protection in the case of external events, whereas Section 7.4
illustrates the case of hiding mutual proximity.
7.1. Temporal Cloaking
For the temporal cloaking experiments, we consider a fixed partitioning of the dataspace into rect-
angular regions (or tiles) of variable size. Tiles are randomly generated, and tile granularity is varied
between 100m and 500m side length. The form factor (or skewness) of a tile T , measured as
max(height(T ), width(T ))
min(height(T ), width(T ))
,
is varied randomly between 1 and 2. Since the CRs are pre-determined by the space partitioning, we
do not consider CR size for temporal cloaking: instead, we focus on space and time error.
First, we measure the fraction of dropped requests in the absence of postdating. This “deferral-
only” method is similar to the solution proposed in [Cheng et al. 2006]. We consider two maximum
delay settings: MaxDelay = 5sec, corresponding to an acceptable response time when asking
queries, and 60sec, reasonable for location updates in a social networking application. Figure 20
shows that, if postdating is not allowed, the failure ratio grows as high as 60% of requests. The
failure ratio is the highest in the scenario of location-based queries (i.e., low MaxDelay) and
an adversary with background knowledge (i.e., dpp distance). The high failure ratio motivates our
choice for request postdating. In the rest of this section, we evaluate the proposed temporal cloak-
ing method, including both request deferral and postdating. We emphasize that in all considered
temporal cloaking scenarios, no request was dropped.
5Available online at http://crawdad.org/roma/taxi/20140717/
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Fig. 20. Ratio of dropped requests in absence of postdating, (a) Hausdorff and (b) maxPP distance
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Fig. 21. Variable velocity, Hausdorff distance
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Fig. 22. Variable velocity, point-pairwise distance
Next, we measure the space and time error incurred by temporal cloaking when the maximum
user velocity is varied, for a fixed partitioning granularity with average tile side 300m. Figure 21
shows the results for the Hausdorff distance, whereas Figure 22 considers point-pairwise distance. In
both cases, the time and space errors exhibit a bell-shaped dependence, as a result of the relationship
between velocity and tile side length. At low velocity, it is likely that several consecutive requests
will fall within the same tile, hence the requests are safe to be issued. As velocity increases initially,
consecutive requests fall within neighboring cells, and the queries need to be deferred/postdated.
However, as velocity continues to increase, the distance traveled by the user between two consec-
utive requests A and B may span several adjacent tiles, but the difference between d(A,B) (either
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Hausdorff or point-pairwise) and v(tB − tA) is small compared to the user velocity (i.e., at most
the diameter of one tile). Therefore, the CR safety condition can be satisfied with only a short delay.
As expected, the more demanding restrictions of point-pairwise distance determine larger absolute
values of space and time error compared to Hausdorff distance.
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Fig. 23. Variable tile size, Hausdorff distance
In Figure 23, we measure the effect of varying the partitioning granularity for two distinct choices
of MaxSpeed and MaxDelay. For brevity, we only show the results for the Hausdorff distance.
The diameter (i.e., diagonal) of the average tile grows with tile side, and consequently, the space
and time errors also increase. This experiment also illustrates the clear trade-off between space and
time error: for low acceptable delays (e.g., MaxDelay = 5sec, suitable for location-based queries)
the space error grows larger (although, in absolute value, it never exceeds 1.5% of the dataspace
side). On the other hand, if longer delays are acceptable, the space error is reduced below 20m.
Figure 24 illustrates the same measurement on the real dataset6. We consider both Slow and
Fast speed settings. Similar trends are observed as in the case of the synthetic data, except that
there is more variability in the results, due to the coarser granularity in varying velocity values.
We emphasize that, in absolute value, the results are much better than in the synthetic data case:
specifically, space error was at most 12 meters, and the request delay at most 2 seconds.
7.2. Spatial Cloaking
For the spatial cloaking case, no pre-defined space partitioning is enforced, and users have the
ability to construct CRs according to their privacy requirements. The construction of CRs when the
attacker has no background knowledge is trivial (e.g., generate random CRs with a certain constraint
on minimum size), so we only consider the case of an adversary with background knowledge, hence
the point-pairwise distance is employed. Since spatial cloaking is not restricted to fixed CRs, we
focus our evaluation on CR size, time error and failure ratio, and we omit space error, which only
represents a significant factor for temporal cloaking.MaxDelay is set to 10sec. In all spatial cloak-
ing tests, we observed that the time required to construct a single CR is below 1sec. We also take
into account the sensitive feature coverage, defined as the percentage of the dataspace area covered
by sensitive features. Intuitively, the larger the sensitive coverage, the more difficult it is to find
low-extent CRs that satisfy the privacy requirement.
Figure 25 shows the resulting CR area (expressed as a percentage of the dataspace area) and the
time error when the user’s sensitivity threshold is varied, for a fixed coverage of 5%. The CR area is
always below 1% of the dataspace area, and it decreases as the sensitivity threshold increases (recall
that, a higher sensitivity threshold corresponds to a less demanding privacy requirement). The time
6Since all experiments prior to this one make use of a granular increase in maximum velocity, which cannot be obtained
using real traces, we restrict the evaluation on the real data to the variable tile size experiment.
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Fig. 24. Variable tile size, Hausdorff distance, Real Dataset
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Fig. 25. Variable Sensitivity
error required by spatial cloaking exhibits a similar trend. A larger velocity results in an increase
of CR size and time error because more sensitive features across a larger area are considered in the
cloaking procedure (i.e., the set SF enclosed by the Minkowski sum of A, according to the notation
in Section 5.2).
In Figure 26 we investigate the effect of sensitive feature coverage for a sensitivity threshold of
0.1. The CR area grows with coverage, since a larger fraction of the dataspace is sensitive, hence
the CR must grow larger in order to include large enough non-sensitive areas. Note that, even for
the most demanding privacy requirements considered (i.e., 10% coverage and 0.1 sensitivity) the
CR area does not exceed 2% of the dataspace. The time error trend also shows an increase with
coverage.
Finally, Table 27 shows that, in most cases, all requests are successfully cloaked. For the 0.1
sensitivity threshold, there are some requests that fail. However, the ratio of such requests is low,
(5% in the worst case).
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Fig. 26. Variable Sensitive Feature Coverage
Sens. Feature Coverage Thr=0.1 Thr=0.2 Thr=0.3
2% 1% 0% 0%
4% 1% 0% 0%
6% 2% 0% 0%
8% 3% 0% 0%
10% 5% 0% 0%
Fig. 27. Failure Ratio
7.3. Protection in the Presence of External Events
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed technique for location protection in
the presence of external events. In absence of such events, each user trajectory is represented by an
ordered set of timestamped CRs. To model external events, such as social media posts, we consider
that an additional tagged object with its own timestamp and geographical coordinates is inserted
into the sequence of user updates. We refer to these additional entries in a user’s trajectory as tags.
For each trajectory, we insert a number of additional tags selected uniformly at random between
1 and the number of snapshots in the user’s trajectory. For each such tag, we randomly select the
time within the user trajectory bounds, and determine the position by using linear interpolation
between two consecutive user-reported positions. This is a realistic model, since the posts about a
user will actually be situated along the user’s trajectory. We average our results over 1, 000 randomly
generated user trajectories.
Recall from Section 6.1 that the amount of overprovisioning that a user performs in order to
increase the likelihood that a future event is approved for publication is modeled by parameter
α, which measures the factor by which the maximum velocity is reduced when computing CRs.
We vary α in the interval 1 to 5, and we determine the impact on rejection rate of tag insertions.
Rejection rate represents the number of tagged events that the user blocks, and has ideal value 0 and
maximum value 1. We also vary the actual maximum velocity of movement as MaxSpeed, as it
also influences the rejection rate.
Figures 28 and 29 present the results for two distinct values of coverage, 1% and 10%, and several
settings of actual maximum speed MaxSpeed. We observe that in the absence of overprovisioning,
a relatively high proportion of tags are rejected, which may exceed 10% for low movement speed
(e.g., walking users). In Figures 28(a) and 29(a), we can observe that as α increases, the rejection
rate drops sharply, proving the effectiveness of the proposed technique. Furthermore, one does not
need to increase considerably the value of α, as a value of 2 or 3 suffices to obtain low rejection rate.
For further increases of α, the additional gain is not significant. In fact, in some cases, the rejection
rate increases slightly, mostly due to random factors of movement and tag generation.
Figures 28(b) and 29(b) illustrate the behavior of the proposed technique when varying the max-
imum user velocity MaxSpeed. We consider a broad interval of velocities, ranging from 1m/s
(walking speed), to 10m/s (cycling speed) and 30m/s (driving speed). Recall from Section 6.1
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Fig. 28. Event Reject Ratio, Coverage = 1%
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Fig. 29. Event Reject Ratio, Coverage = 10%
that, for a given α value, the absolute reduction in velocity when computing CRs is proportional
to MaxSpeed, hence we expect an increase in velocity to yield lower rejection rate. In addition, a
higher MaxSpeed also has a benefic effect on rejection rate as the actual user movement speed is
fast, and therefore the user is able to travel relatively quickly between consecutive location updates.
We observe that the walking speed range is most prone to rejected tags, whereas the rejection rate
becomes negligible at higher speeds.
We also observe that an increase in coverage rate does affect negatively the rejection rate, but not
significantly (to observe this increase, one can compare the corresponding graphs from Figures 28
and 29). This can be explained by the fact that, once the user CRs are selected according to the more
strict coverage requirements, they are already large, so the effect of additional tags may not be that
difficult to overcome. In other words, due to the already stringent requirements imposed by the user
movement, the additional requirement imposed by overprovisioning for tag events is not significant.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of the protection algorithm in the presence of external events
on a real dataset. Figures 30 shows the results. Due to the inability to control in a fine-grained
manner the maximum velocity for real data, we show results only for variable α, and two different
speed thresholds, Slow and Fast. The results are very encouraging, as the rejection ratio is well
below the one recorded for synthetic data. In the worst case, 6% of the update requests get rejected.
The time error is also low, with 10 seconds as maximum value. As expected, the space error grows
with α, and for larger values it may become significant, up to 300 meters. Nevertheless, the results
show that, given the low rejection error and time error values, one can safely set the α value to be
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Fig. 30. Protection in the presence of external events on real dataset
small (e.g., 1 or 2), and as a result the space error at this setting is also small, less than 100 meters.
The results on real data confirm the practical applicability of the proposed technique.
7.4. Protecting User Proximity Relationship
We evaluate next the performance of the proposed technique to protect the mutual proximity dis-
tance relationship between a pair of users. We consider separation threshold values in the range
between 250 meters and 4, 000 meters, which is a relatively broad range of requirements for a total
considered movement space of 20×20 kilometers. We generate pairs of trajectories moving towards
each other, and which intersect after an average number of 20 timestamps. To hide user proximity,
the proposed technique will move CRs in opposite direction to each other, and as a result each user
will experience delays in their reported locations, and consequently, in received service. We measure
the amount of delay as a measure of loss in quality of service.
Figure 31(a) illustrates the effect of maximum velocity on the user-experienced delays, denoted
as AvgT imeError. For very low-speed movement, the need to hide mutual proximity comes at a
high cost, as it takes users a long time to arrive within the safe-to-disclose CRs (recall from Section
6.2 that in order to protect against mutual proximity detection, it may be necessary to report CRs
that do not actually enclose the user). In some cases, the updates may need to be delayed for over
60 seconds. However, as the maximum velocity increases, the proposed technique is able to achieve
protection at a much lower penalty in terms of quality of service decreases. For moderate movement
speeds, and separation threshold values that to not exceed 1, 000 meters, the experienced delays are
lower than 10 seconds.
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Figure 31(b) presents the evolution of the time error as the separation threshold increases. As
expected, a higher value of the separation threshold results in higher delays, as the CRs have to be
moved further apart from each other. Nevertheless, for moderate values of maximum velocity, the
obtained delays are always below 30 seconds. For high speeds, the delays are negligible for most of
the range of separation threshold values. In practice, we believe that a separation threshold of 1, 000
is likely to be sufficient, and one can observe that for this setting, the delays are not significant.
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Fig. 31. Effect of Mutual Proximity Protection on Service Delays
In our final experiment, we evaluate the effectiveness of the mutual proximity protection tech-
nique on real data. Figure 32 shows the space and time errors obtained for two speed settings, Slow
and Fast, and several different proximity threshold settings. As expected, the space and time errors
increase with the threshold. However, the actual time error values are smaller than in the case of
synthetic data, with a worst-case delay of approximately 20 seconds. The space error is around 300
meters in the worst case, which is less than 10% of the proximity threshold setting. These results
confirm the good performance of the proposed technique for real data.
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Fig. 32. Effect of Mutual Proximity Protection for Real Datasets
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8. USABILITY AND INTEGRATION WITH EXISTING LOCATION-BASED SERVICES
The objective of our work is to provide a balanced location protection approach which achieves
good privacy and does not incur significant performance overhead. We have evaluated the above two
objectives experimentally in Section 7. In addition, for our approach to gain widespread adoption, it
is necessary to consider two additional factors: (i) usability aspects, and (ii) integration with existing
location-based services (LBS). While a comprehensive study on these topics is outside the scope of
this article, we provide in this section an informal discussion and outline future work directions
towards achieving widespread adoption of the proposed techniques in real-life systems.
8.1. Usability
Making end-users aware of security and privacy threats, and devising controls that do not signifi-
cantly affect usability are serious and ongoing concerns in the broader security and privacy research,
not only in the location privacy area. In order to help widespread adoption of privacy-preserving
services, it is important to reduce the burden on end users with respect to privacy-related system
settings and parameters. Furthermore, users should be shielded from low-level technical details, and
the privacy settings and parameter choices provided must be intuitive.
In the case of our proposed approach, the protection model is directly related to the ability of an
adversary to locate the user within a certain geographical enclosure, e.g., a building, a neighborhood,
or the location of an event. We believe that this approach tends to be more intuitive than other models
which rely on more complex, statistical models of privacy that are difficult to understand by the end
users. For instance, other approaches use protection definitions based on entropy, or probability
of existence of a user within a dataset, which rely on understanding of advanced mathematical
concepts. In contrast, our solution defines privacy with respect to the percentage of the reported area
that lies within a certain sensitive region. In our view, a user is more likely to relate to a statement
such as “this privacy setting ensures that sensitive areas represent only 10% of the reported region”.
The issue of setting system parameters is also an important one. A usable solution should have
few parameters that need to be provided as input, and the choices of parameters should be simple
and intuitive. Specifically, in our case, MaxDelay is the maximum amount of time that the user is
willing to wait for a query answer or service update. Response time is a parameter that a user can
easily relate to. A simple graphical user interface (GUI) dialogue can be shown to the user the first
time the system is set up, and prompt for a value for this parameter.
Furthermore, the sensitive threshold value is a direct representation of the association probability
with sensitive features, which is the maximum percentage of a CR that can be covered by that
sensitive feature type (e.g., 10% or 25%). In addition, for users who do not wish to provide numerical
thresholds, one can design a Likert-scale GUI with several levels: e.g., low sensitivity (70-80%),
moderate (20-50%), or high (below 20%). Similarly, for the maximum delay parameter, one can
choose from several discrete options, labeled for instance as low delay (below 5 sec), moderate
delay (5-30 sec), long delay (30-60 sec).
8.2. Integration with Existing LBS
Existing systems that process location updates are typically designed to accept as input individual
locations, or groups of individual locations. However, in the case of our approach, the LBS must
process updates that are submitted in the form of rectangular regions (CRs). This feature may require
changes on behalf of the service providers to support processing of regions.
Our work assumes that a processing engine for regions exists at the LBS. In the spatial databases
literature [de Berg et al. 2000] several approaches exist for processing regions. We emphasize that
the adoption by the service providers of such techniques is not a requirement of location privacy
solutions alone. Instead, many novel types of queries such as nearest-neighbor of groups of users
or skylines require such operations. Hence, we believe that there will be strong incentive for LBS
providers to adopt such processing techniques.
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Another related concern is that of processing cost. In the case of processing regions, the computa-
tional overhead is typically higher than for points. However, as shown in previous work on location
privacy with CRs [Kalnis et al. 2007], the performance obtained is quite good. To account for the
additional overhead, the providers may impose an additional small processing fee, either in the form
of a subscription, or indirectly through more advertisements, or requiring the users to complete a
survey, etc. In addition, we expect that policy makers, who are becoming increasingly aware of the
risks that privacy breaches pose to society, may mandate the use of such techniques, in a similar
manner in which healthcare providers must implement controls to protect medical records.
9. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we identified attacks on location privacy that occur when an adversary is able to use
information such as maximum user velocity, geo-tagged social network posts, or mutual proximity
between users. The proposed spatial and temporal transformations enforce privacy without signif-
icant deterioration of QoS. The techniques for overprovisioning to reduce the amount of blocked
posts and for hiding mutual proximity are also effective in achieving protection without significant
QoS deterioration.
In future work, we plan to investigate protection techniques against proximity-based and exter-
nal event attacks when user movement is restricted to road networks. In this setting, the distance
computation between consecutive user positions is more complex. In addition, the adversary has
increased capabilities to prune “empty spaces” that do not belong to roads.
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